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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and

Appella;nt~

Case No.
10251

vs.

TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. )
WEST,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
Appeal From the Judgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Rulon R. West, plaintiff and appellant, respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on the following
grounds:
1. The opinion of the court was based upon a mis-
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taken assumption that the trial court had found that
plaintiff made a gift to the defendants on April2, 1960.
2. The issue of whether a gift was made by the
suppelmental agreement of April 2, 1960, was decided

on the prior appeal and was not tried in the court below.

SUPPOR'.fiNG BRIEF
ARGUMENT
I

THE OPINION OF 'fHE COURT WAS
BASED UPON A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD FOUND
THAT PLAIN'I'IFF lVIADE A GIFT TO THE
DEFENDANTS ON APRIL 2, 1960.
In its opinion this court proceeded on the assumption that the trial court had found a gift on April 2,
1960, saying:

'' * * * there

is a reasonable basis in the evidence upon which the trial court could fairly
regard it as constituting the required clear .and
convincing proof that Rulon West had given
401o of the entire enterprise, including his capital
contributions, to his son, Terry, and 20Cfo thereof to his wife, Flora, at the time of dissolution.}}
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court, however, did not so find. What it did
find (if all of the findings are considered) was that in
the original articles of partnership Rulon R. West

2
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agreed to contribute capital to the enterprise with the
understanding that each contribution would be a gift
to the partnership and that on dissolution such contributed capital would be distributed on the 40-40-20
basis. This agreement, insofar as it was executory,
was unenforceable for lack of consideration, and the
trial court found that on December 3, 1958, Rulon sent
a letter to Terry renouncing an intention to "give"
any more money to the partnr~rship. The trial court
implicitly found that on and after December 3, 1958,
the donative intention did not exist. There is ample
evidence to support that finding.
The original "Minute Entry of Decision" of the
trial court (R. 59) does not once mention a gift; its
lead sentence is, "The Articles of Partnership are
binding upon the parties." Its second sentence refers
to the intentions of the parties in the articles~ and the
court goes on to find:
"T4~

following items were not contributed for
capital credit and an eventual possible 40-40-20
distribution:
(a) All contributions of Rulon R. West on
and after the date of December 3, 1958, including the $2,000.00 check dated February 26,
1960, and the $350.00 check of March 21, 1960."
The first mention of gift occurs in findings prepared by the defendants and respondents on their counsel's stationery, and even they do not find a gift on
April 2, 1960. After reciting in Paragraph 5 that all
amounts paid in to and including December 2, 1958,

3
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were contributions to capital, the formal findings go
on to find (R. 69) that:
"The several payments totaling $29,645.39
paid into the partnership by Rulon on and after
pecember ~' 1~58, were n?t intended to be paid
In as contributions to capital, and were not intended to be distributed to partners in the proportion 40-40-20 upon dissolution as hereinafter
set forth.''
The only finding 'vith respect to a gift was in paragraph 10 (R. 70-71) which reads as follows:
"That the parties and particularly plaintiff,
R,ulon~ and defendant~ Terry~ intended and understood that the effect of the agreements whereby Terry and Flora would receive, upon dissolution, forty ( 40) percent and twenty (20) percent respectively of the amounts paid into capital
by Rulon as finally adjusted and determined
herein, 'Was that such receipt was by way of gift
from Rulon to Terry and Flora."
In his brief to the court on this appeal, appellant
pointed out at page 20 that:
"The court refused to find that the 'Supplemental Agreement' (Exhibit 16) (found by this
court insufficient to constitute a gift) had operative effect, taking the position that it was un·
enforceable for lack of consideration. The express
negative finding is not inclu~ed .i~ ~he formal
findings of fact, but may be Implicit In the fact
that it is not mentioned in Conclusion of Law
No. 1."
This statement of fact in appellant's brief was not
controverted by respondents-as this court's rules re-

4
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quire it to be in event of disagreement-and it may be
assumed that respondents had no objection to the statement.
Inastnuch as the findings of fact and conclusions
of la'v 'vere prepared by respondents' experienced and
learned counsel, one would think there would have been
an express finding of gift on April 2, 1960, if this had
been what either trial court or counsel had in mind.
But there was no such finding. Even the respondents
have not taken the position that the gift had been made
by the supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960. The
following is quoted from page 20 of the respondents'
brief to this court :
"The court did not award by way of gift. Let
us be clear on this. The court said Rulon and
Terry '"intended and understood that the effect
of the agreements~ was that Terry and Flora received by way of gift. This distinction is real and
not technical. This is an entirely different matter
than the court making its award on the theory
of gift.
While the parties clearly intended and believed that a gift had been made it is completely
academic in the affirmance of the judgment
whether a g!.ft was made or not. The judgment
does not rise or fall on gift. The total import
of the findings, conclusions and judgment is that
the parties agreed that Rulon was to put up
capital, Terry was to change his life's course
and operate the venture, that the losses were to
be proportionately taken and borne by the
parties, the parties were to receive interest on
5
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the invested capital, and upon dissolution net
assets or capital was to be distributed i~ the
proportions herein repeatedly stated. These intentions were expressly written in the articles
and in the dissolution agreement as amplified b;
the supplemental agreement .
. This .r~sult is a re~ult of rights and obligations a~Is~ng from basic contra~t law. Ambiguity
was originally thought by this court to obtain
in regard to whether Rulon's money was loan
or capital. That ambiguity has been removed by
a scholarly and arduous search on the part of
the trial court.
Evidence of tax talk and of g.ift talk by the
parties has here been adduced by the writer to
show the basic contract intent~ not to show gift
intent per se, although it is clear that a gift had
in fact been made as a result of the operation
of all agreements. Rulon agreed to file a return
to implement this concept." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court found that the amounts paid into
the partnership by Rulon R. West prior to his letter
of December 3, 1958, were meant to be gifts to the
partnership, but the amounts paid into the partnership on and after December 3, 1958, were meant to be
repaid, whether classified as "loans" or something else.
This court erred in construing the findings of fact to
mean that Rulon had made a gift on April 2, 1960, by
the terms of the supplemental agreement.
Even if it is assumed that the evidence would
justify such a finding, the evidence does not require it.
Inasmuch as the supposed finding was not in fact

6
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made, the findings are perfectly consistent, one with
the other. Their theory was that an intention to make
a gift existed at the time the original partnership was
entered into and that it was presumed to continue
until Rulon renounced that intention.
Whether the court made its finding with respect
to the supplemental agreement makes all the difference
in the world to this case. 'fhis court, in analyzing the
findings, held that the trial court's finding of a gift on
April 2, 1960, was inconsistent with the finding that
the contributions made after December 3, 1958, were
intended to be returned :
"The making of the gift at the time the dissolution being established, no matter what plaintiff may have done or said prior to that time inconsistent with the theory for gift, and no matter
how completely or absolutely he had retained
ownership or control of the property prior to
that time, would make no difference. Inasmuch
as he clearly indicated his intent to make the
proportionate gifts to the defendants of the entire
enterprise after that date and stated no exception
or limitation in doing so, we can see no basis
upon which to sustain the finding which excepts
those advancements from the judgment."

II

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A GIFT WAS
MADE BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREE1\iENT OF APRIL 2, 1960, WAS DECIDED ON
7
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THE PRIOR APPEAL AND WAS N 0 'l'
'l.,RIED IN THE COURT BELOW.
When this case was here before the question of
gift was argued in the brief and ruled upon by the
court. At page 15 of appellant's brief in the first case
(No. 9870) it was pointed out that if the defendants
were relying upon the agreement of April 2, 1960, the
appellant would be prepared to show that there was
undue influence in obtaining the gift, the influence arising out of the fact that great pressure was put on a
susceptible Rulon West when Rulon was concerned
about an imminent departure for South America. The
need for such evidence appeared to vanish when this
court handed down its opinion, for the court had the
following to say about the supplemental agreement of
April 2, 1960:
"A careful perusal of this latter instrument
will show that it does not indicate clearly a donative intent as it must do to make a gift. It simply
purports to be an acknowledgment that the interests that Terry R. West and Flora E. 'Vest
had theretofore acquired were by gift. It is not
any more definitive as to what those intere~ts
were in relation to partnership 'assets to be distributed' in event of dissolution than were the
other documents."
Having disposed of that document, the court went
on to analyze the meaning of the partnership articles
and the dissolution agreement and sent the case back
to the trial court to take evidence as to the intent of
the parties in executing them. Thereafter the parties

8
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proceeded as if the supplemental agreement of April
2, 1960, was not an operative agreement, certainly not
a deed of gift. The subsequent pre-trial order provided
that the primary issues to be tried were the meanings
of the contracts entered into by the parties. The whole
tenor of the pre-trial order and amendment to it so
indicate, and the parties did not in fact litigate the
question of whether the supplemental agreement was
a gift.
If the decision as handed down by this court is
allowed to stand, the plaintiff will have been deprived
of the opportunity to try the question of the validity
of a gift on April 2, 1960-largely because of reliance
on this court's statements in the prior opinion. That
the plaintiff regarded the question of gift as being out
of the case is apparent in excerpts from proceedings
at the trial. The following appears at page 254 of the
record:
"MR. ROE: The plaintiff rests.
In connection with the defendant's case for
yesterday, there is one statement I would like
to make for the record. In reading the deposition
of Ruth West Francis reference was made to
the statement made by the plaintiff with respect
to the gift to Terry and Flora on about April 2.
I did not object to this testimony because it
does relate to some of the issues as to the construction of the other agreements. However, I
want to state for the record I do not consent,
either expressly or impliedly, to including as
an issue in this case, whether a gift was 1nade
on April 2, 1960.

9
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I think that has been resolved by a decision
of the Supreme Court, by the concessions made
in Chambers by the defendant on Monday and
by the opening statement of Mr. Rannow. '
I just want to make the record clear I do not
consent to trying that issue.

MR. RONNOW: The issue of that gift was
made on April 21

MR. ROE: Yes.
MR. RONNOW: You do not repudiate the
theory the gift was implicit in the lawsuit? You
have some gift questions at some other times.
MR. ROE: I am making my objection and
my statement with respect to the operative effect
of that supplemental agreement of April 2,
1960.

MR. RONNOW: I understand." (Emphasis
added.)
Again, at page 291 of the record, objection was made:
"Q. I now hand you what has been marked as
proposed exhibit 16, which is an original typewritten document bearing two signatures, and
ask you what that document is?

A. It is a Supplemental Agreement to the Dissolution Agreement signed April 2, 1960. * * *

MR. RONNO,,T: I offer 16.
1\tiR. ROE: I object to 16 on the ground, your
Honor, first it purports to be supplemental to
a Dissolution Agreement which was never finally
executed by the parties, and, second that insofar
as it purpo"rts to be a gift, it is outside. the !~sues
of this case, and already been determined.

10
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A similar objection was made to testimony of E. L.
Schoenhals (R. 337).
Even Terry West did not take the position that
the supplemental agreement was an operative document
(R. 292):
"Q. State, briefly, what in your mind gave rise
to the need of amplification.

A. Well, as I read the dissolution agreement,
in my attorney's office this morning-well, I read
it the day before, but as of the morning we went
out to Murray, I read it, the question come to my
mind, 'as of today' I receive 40<fo of what we
sell that business for, whatever the net assets of
the business are, as of that day. I am liable to
give half of it back to Uncle Sam.'
Q. Explain that. What do you mean by give
half to Uncle Sam?

A. I knew this would have to be shown as ordinary income, or gain upon sale of the business.
I knew that.
I didn't know the amount, but I felt the
greater portion would be paid as income taxes,
to ordinary income or capital gains tax. * * *
What I was co~cerned with, the Internal Revenue would consider it income. That is what
led me to have my attorney, Ed Schoenhals, draw
up the supplemental agreement to show that
this was a gift~ tax free.~~ (Emphasis added.)
Terry's understanding as to the effect and purpose
of the supplemental agreement was confirmed by the
testimony of E. L. Schoenhals ( R. 342) :

11
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" * * * Mr. Wunderli wanted to have this
exhibit No. 2 signed before Rulon left. Rulon
did not want to sign it until he understood that
Terry was going to take some action to get him
out of there, and get his money for him-40/c
of what he had put in this, he wanted back, and
Mr. Wunderli wanted this signed, and I told
Mr. Wunderli that along with this-so there
wouldn't be any question about it, this other
agreement should be signed, in which Mr. West
would agree to file a gift tax return.
Mr. Wunderli made no objection to that, and
told me to go ahead on it * * * The thing I was
involved in, and the thing I had been requested
to do, was to arrange this matter, to give assurance that Rulon West would give a gift tax
return in connection with this matter.
Q. Your primary concern at that time was to
get Rulon to sign the supplemental agreement?

A. My primary concern was to make sure
Rulon understood that Ru-lon was going to file
a gift tax return in connection with this matter."
(Emphasis added.)
As pointed out above, even respondents tried and
argued this case as if the issue being tried was the question of interpretation of other contract documents, and
the effect of the supplemental agreement on them:
"Evidence of tax talk and gift talk by the parties has here been adduced by the writer to show
the basic contract intent, not to show gift intent
per se. * * *" (Respondents' brief Page 21).
It would be a denial of due process of law (under
both the Utah and United States Constitutions) for

12
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this court to enter a finding with respect to an Issue
that was not litigated in the trial court. cf. U. S. v.
Ahtanum lrr. Dist. (D.C. Wash., 1954) 124 F. Supp.
818.

Under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, amendment to pleadings are freely
allowed. But the rule contemplates that when evidence
is offered at the trial which is objected to as being outside the issues, something should be done to expand
the issues. The rule contemplates that if the pleadings
or pre-trial order are amended to include additional
issues, the other party, if he would be prejudiced by it,
is entitled to a continuance. This court has held that
the rule does not permit the entry of a finding on an
issue was actually tried. As Justice Crockett said in
National Farmer~s Union Property & Ca8ualty Co v.
Thompson~ 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P .2d 249:
"Plaintiff urges that inasmuch as the evidence
of value just referred to was voluntarily introduced by defendant, the court could pass on the
issue, citing Rule 15 (b) to the effect that,
though an issue is not raised by the pleadings,
liberal amendment should be allowed 'even after
judgment'; and further that the judge could
modify the judgment as he did, under the authority of Rule 54 (c) :

' * * * Every final

judgment shall grant
the relief to which party in whose favor it
is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings.'
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must

13
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not lose sight of the cardinal principal that under
our system of justice, if an issue is to be tried
and a party~s rights concluded with respect there ..
to~ he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. This is recognized in Rule 15 (b)
which recites that such liberal amendment shalJ
be allowed· if the issue is tried 'by express or
implied consent of the parties.' It does not appear that there was any such consent to try the
issue of the value of. this building." (Emphasis
added.)
If respondents' counsel genuinely intended that
the supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, constituted a gif~, he had an obligation to say something about
it when objection was made to that line of questioning.
The comments he actually made show an acquiescence
in the view that this was not an issue in the case. His
brief takes the same view; and appellant did not consent, expressly or impliedly to try the issue. Had it
been added as an issue appellant would have been entitled to a continuance to obtain testimony relating the
reality of Rulon's consent.

CONCLUSION
If the court's decision remains as written, respondents will have been allowed to profit by an apparent
inconsistency they created themselves in preparing
findings of fact for the court, and to recover on a theory
that they themselves had abandoned.
Had plaintiff been put on notice that the issue of
"gift by supplemental agree1nent" was being tried, the

14
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case could have been presented in a different way.
Evidence might have been presented as to the susceptibility of Rulon West to suggestions of learned and
experienced counsel in E. L. Schoenhals, and as to
the pressure placed upon him at the Murray meeting.
Earl M. Wunderli-who represented plaintiff-would
have been asked to return to Utah from his home in
New York to testify about the purpose of the supplemental agreement as explained to him by Mr. Schoenhals.
But even if the court finds that the matter was
"tried", there is a more serious objection to the decision:
This court has taken over the role of fact finder ; created
an inconsistency in the findings of fact; and rejected
a consequent inconsistent finding.
The findings must be read as a whole; so read they
make it clear that the trial court found the "gifts" to
have been made pro tanto as sums of money were paid
into the partnership; and that the requisite intention
was no longer there after Rulon West's letter of December 3, 1958. So construed, there is no inconsistency.
If, as pointed out by the court in its opinion, "findings which are at variance with the claims of both parties" should be "closely scrutinized," an opinion of an
appellate court similarly at variance should be similarly
scrutinized. And the court's opinion here rejects not
only the positions of all parties, but that of a trial judge
as well.
The case should be reheard and reconsidered, and
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the question of the validity of the gifts to the partnership prior to December 3, 1958, decided on the basis
of authorities cited in appellant's prior briefs.
That portion of the decision denying the credit
to Rulon of $29,645.39, being based upon an erroneous
assumption, should be reversed and the credit reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
411 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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